AVB and trust boundaries
VERIFIED OFFLINE (descriptor integrity) · UNVERIFIED (bootloader acceptance).
Research: DOCS/restructuring/c28/C28-AVB-TRUST-MODEL.md,
C28-BOOTLOADER-ACCEPTANCE-GATES.md, LIEPPOS-C28-AVB-TRUST.md @ ae6dce06.
Six mechanisms that are easy to conflate
| # | Mechanism | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | AVB root trust | Factory root is signed with the public AOSP testkey_rsa2048 (cdbb7717…). The C28 root uses the same key, so the root-trust relationship is identical to stock |
| 2 | OEM boot chain | Key 9d808b09… signs the stock boot footer. Not reproduced. C28 binds boot with a root hash descriptor over the C26 image instead of the location-3 chain |
| 3 | Boot-image signature metadata | Stock boot.img is header v4 with signature_size = 0, so it has no v4 signature block. The earlier claim that the footer is a confirmed Google GKI key is superseded: it cannot be confirmed from the images |
| 4 | Kernel module signing | 60 GKI modules signed with the C26 kernel’s own module key, whose certificate is embedded in the C26 Image (see DLKM) |
| 5 | dm-verity | Hashtrees present for system, system_ext, product, odm_dlkm, system_dlkm, vendor_dlkm; bring-up on hardware unverified |
| 6 | Bootloader acceptance | UNVERIFIED. No gate was exercised |
A successful AVB verification with a development key is not proof of bootloader acceptance. AVB and the GKI boot-signature mechanism are independent; neither replaces the other.
Observed, not guaranteed
- Stock boots with a root signed by the AOSP test key; the live Slot-A root has
flags = 3and an invalid signature, yet boots — the bootloader appears unlocked or permissive. - Slot-B root
a9d8cd21…(experiment keyd6b1afef…) reached Android 17 second-stage init on 2026-10-03, so LK accepted a non-stock root key.
Hardware gates (all open)
| # | Gate | Pass criterion |
|---|---|---|
| G1 | Lock state | ro.boot.verifiedbootstate, ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state |
| G2 | Root with flags = 0 | LK reaches kernel; /proc/pl_lk, pstore |
| G3 | boot as root hash descriptor | LK does not require the OEM chain |
| G4 | GKI boot signature | not required (signature_size = 0) |
| G5 | Rollback | stored indexes 0/2/4 ≤ 0; location 3 unreferenced |
| G6 | Module signing | no -EACCES for the 60 GKI modules |
| G7 | dm-verity | system_dlkm / vendor_dlkm verity devices appear |
| G8 | First-stage UFS | ufs-mediatek-mod probes, super appears |
None exercised. Hardware validation: 0.
Rollback
Every C28 rollback index is 0, matching the factory values for locations 0, 2 and 4. Location 3 (boot chain) is no longer referenced. Device-stored rollback values were not captured offline.
Hazard: do not flash a Slot-B package to a production device. The bound stock Android 15 userspace needs 4,948.9 MiB; Slot B offers 2,173.7 MiB. The verdict is
OFFLINE_PREFLIGHT_FAILED.